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A la recherche du “sens” perdu:
Copyrightable Creativity
Deconstructed
Thomas M. Byron*
I.

Introduction

As the functional capabilities of computing systems
continue to grow and mature, computers are no longer just
replacing human labor.
They are also infiltrating areas
traditionally considered the province of human judgment. By
way of an example of this phenomenon, two researchers at
Rutgers University have recently designed computer software
that can analyze works of art and rank them based on their
creativity.1
Their software works by leveraging image
processing technology to analyze digital images of paintings.2 It
then applies a fixed algorithm to the input images that
determines the depicted painting’s creativity based on two
factors, the work’s novelty and historical influence.3 The values
assigned to the novelty and influence variables are generated
within the software through a chronological analysis of the

J.D., Emory University School of Law, M.A., Boston University, B.A.,
Dartmouth College. The author wishes to acknowledge the helpful feedback of
Christopher Buccafusco, Dan Burk, and Roberta Kwall on an earlier
presentation of this Article. The author currently serves as Corporate Counsel
for the MathWorks, Inc. while pursuing a Ph.D. in French Literature at Boston
University. The opinions expressed here are the author’s alone, and do not
reflect those of MathWorks or B.U.
1. Dominic Basulto, Why it matters that computers are now able to judge
human
creativity,
WASH.
POST
(June
18,
2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/innovations/wp/2015/06/18/why-itmatters-that-computers-are-now-able-to-judge-human-creativity/.
See also
Ahmed Elgammal and Babak Saleh, Quantifying Creativity in Art Networks,
PROC. OF THE SIXTH INT’L CONF. ON COMPUTATIONAL CREATIVITY 39-47 (2015).
2. Id. at 39. The researchers claim that the software could also analyze
sculpture, literature, and other fields; but their initial work covered only
painting. Id. at 46.
3. Id. at 40.
*
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totality of paintings input to the system. Essentially, the
software analyzes each painting in the context of its historical
moment—say, Leonardo da Vinci’s Mona Lisa, completed as late
as 1517—by way of comparison with other paintings that
preceded and succeeded it—perhaps Titian’s Allegory of
Prudence completed between 1565 and 1575.4 Paintings unlike
their predecessors, but which sparked substantial similarity in
successors, were deemed most creative.5 The obverse case,
where a painting parroted an earlier work without generating
later mimicry, led to the opposite result, a finding of lesser
creativity.6 The software’s initial iteration spanned over 62,000
works of art created over a period of roughly 600 years, from
1400 AD to the present.7 The winners in this creativity pageant?
Leonardo’s work (perhaps unsurprisingly) received high marks
when measured against his Renaissance peers.8 Van Gogh
produced some favorably analyzed work in the latter half of the
nineteenth century, while Mondrian’s geometric vision seems to
have carried the first half of the twentieth.9 Finally, recent
works by Fernando Calhau and Piero Dorazio are the standard
bearers for modern art.10
This software’s advent has to come as something of a relief
to the art community. No longer will art historians need to
debate the artistic and creative merits of various paintings.
Software like that described above will provide them with a clear
and simple answer. No longer will impassioned arguments
between art students drown out the rhythm of chairs placed on
tables in cafés closing in Rome’s Monti and Paris’ Rive gauche.
Such students will have at their fingertips an electronic ranking
as readymade as the Marcel Duchamp fountain whose virtues
they extol.11 No longer will a painter new to the field need to
question the creativity of her first work. It will be susceptible to
4. Id. at 41.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See Basulto, supra note 1.
8. See Elgammal & Saleh, supra note 1, at 46.
9. Id. at 45.
10. Id. at 46.
11. For more on Duchamp, see READYMADES OF MARCEL DUCHAMP,
http://www.saylor.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Readymades-ofMarcel-Duchamp.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2016).
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a clear classification, if not upon its immediate creation, then at
least after the passage of time grants context to the work’s
historical influence. And no longer will the present day require
its own version of works of historical fiction like Emile Zola’s
L’Œuvre12 or the Goncourts’ Manette Salomon.13 Modern
software will obviate the need for a refreshed take on these
novels, whose fictional painters Claude Lantier and Coriolis are
relegated to ignored, but highly creative, struggle while the art
establishment crowns their less creative confrères.
The creativity-ranking software stands to have an
additional, less likely beneficiary—the legal community in the
form of copyright scholars and judges applying copyright law.
This is because the latter body of law relies on creativity in
certain critical respects.
At a general level, copyright’s
fundamental charge is the promotion of creativity14 - a charge
indirectly captured in copyright law’s Constitutional foundation,
which empowers Congress to “promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts.”15 The Science mentioned in the clause is often
associated with copyright protection16 and accordingly serves
the end of creativity in myriad protected forms, from painting
and sculpture to maps and books. Beyond the overarching
creativity inherent in copyright’s purpose, creativity rears its
head more specifically in a number of sub-doctrinal areas of

12. See generally EMILE ZOLA, L’ŒUVRE (Elek Books Ltd. 1886).
13. See generally EDMOND & JULES DE GONCOURT, MANETTE SALOMON
(Eugène Fasquelle ed., Bibliothèque- Charpentier 1897).
14. This premise is highlighted ubiquitously in judicial opinions and
copyright scholarship, but for a couple of examples, see Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (noting the Copyright
Clause “is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors
by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the
products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has
expired.”). William F. Patry & Shira Perlmutter, Fair Use Misconstrued:
Profit, Presumptions, and Parody, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 667, 690, n.104
(1992).
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
16. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 884 (2012) (including only “Science,”
and not “useful Arts,” when citing the Copyright Clause). This is in
contradistinction to the mention of “useful Arts” in the same Constitutional
provision, which is regularly interpreted to refer to Congress’ ability to enact
patent legislation. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1965)
(mentioning only the “useful Arts” portion of the clause when discussing patent
protection).
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copyright.17 When assessing whether a derivative work is
sufficiently original to merit its own copyright protection,
copyright law relies on a variety of creativity standards. An oftcited example of one such creativity analysis occurred in L.
Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder,18 a case involving a recreation of a
public domain Uncle Sam piggy bank. There, the Second Circuit
found that the recreation in question did not sufficiently build
on the original to merit copyright protection because the later
work did not evince “substantial originality”19 vis-à-vis its public
domain predecessor.20 Other circuits have adopted their own
standards when determining whether a derivative work
embodies sufficient creativity to merit copyright protection.
These standards may be mapped on a scale, where bookending
the substantial creativity required by the Batlin case are
minimal creativity and gross creativity standards.21
In a subset more relevant to the analysis proposed here,
copyright law also relies on assessments of creativity when
asking the threshold question of whether a specific work is
copyrightable at all. This requirement follows from the Supreme
Court’s decision in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone
Service Co.,22 which declined to find infringement where a
telephone company had copied another company’s white pages
telephone directory.23 The Court based its decision not on the
extent of copying by the former company—it was clear that the
copying had been wholesale in nature24—but on the lack of

17. In addition to those areas discussed here, Professor Gregory Mandel
has noted creativity’s importance to determinations of joint authorship. Such
determinations often turn on a stereotypical view of creativity, depending on
whether they are made in patent or copyright contexts. See generally Gregory
N. Mandel, Left-Brain versus Right-Brain: Competing Conceptions of
Creativity in Intellectual Property Law, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 283 (2010).
18. L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1976).
19. Id. at 491.
20. Id. at 492.
21. Robert A. Gorman, Copyright Courts and Aesthetic Judgments: Abuse
or Necessity?, 25 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 6 (2001) (observing these three
standards of creativity).
22. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
23. Id. at 342-44, 363.
24. Id. at 344. The copying was so substantial as to reach fictional names
included by the original white page compiler.
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copyrightability of the original white pages.25 For lack of
copyright protection, then, the original telephone directory
compiler could not show infringement. The Court supported this
finding by inaugurating a new standard of originality required
of a work to obtain copyright protection.
Where works
traditionally only had to be original to their authors in the sense
of having been created by their authors without copying another
work,26 the Feist decision added a second Constitutionallymandated27 requirement—that a work also evidence a “modicum
of creativity”28 to qualify for copyright protection. Because the
white pages at issue in Feist were deemed “garden-variety” and
“devoid of even the slightest trace of creativity,”29 they did not
satisfy this new requirement.
In either the context of derivative works or Feist’s
originality standard, software like that designed by the Rutgers
researchers might benefit both courts and copyright scholars.
Certain updates to the software would be necessary, however.
First, the software would have to be expanded to include piggy
banks, telephone directories, and any other object whose
creativity was at issue in a given litigation. Each class of goods
might require its own iteration of the software—with the
creativity of piggy banks being compared to other piggy banks,
the creativity of phone directories being compared to other phone
directories, and so on. While litigants might hypothetically
argue over the proper set of works to be included in a specific
class, the authors of the creativity software do contemplate
expansion to other fields beyond painting.30 Once the spectrum
for creativity is mapped for a given class of works, all that would
remain for a court to make a determination on creativity would
be to assign threshold values corresponding to each standard at
different points on the spectrum. A certain point would map to
a “modicum of creativity” for the Feist originality standard, and
other points would track to the three different creativity
25. Id. at 362.
26. See, e.g., Ralph D. Clifford, Random Numbers, Chaos Theory, and
Cogitation: A Search for the Minimal Creativity Standard in Copyright Law,
82 DENV. U. L. REV. 259, 260 (2004) [hereinafter Random Numbers].
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See Elgammal & Saleh, supra note 1, at 39.
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standards applied in derivative works cases. The thorny,
qualitative, and subjective question of creativity would thereby
be reduced to a predictable, quantitative, and objective analysis
in the hands of courts.
If only it were so simple. Beyond the methodological issues
just barely addressed regarding the application of software to
questions of copyrightable creativity, there looms a far more
monolithic issue. How can software meaningfully compute
creativity? The short answer to this—and the authors of the
creativity software acknowledge as much—is “it cannot, at least
not with any complete precision.” The authors of the creativity
software note in particular that their chosen analysis was
limited by a few critical factors.
Because creativity is
determined within the software on the basis of only the set of
images scanned, the software’s results are only as good as the
richness of its database.31 A greater number of paintings
scanned might have changed the program’s output by
potentially catching new pioneers earlier in time and
condemning the previously vaunted to the status of less-creative
laggards. Further, the program can only analyze “what it sees,”
that is, the images fed to it through a scanning process and
subject to “underlying computer vision methods.”32 It does not
appreciate the rich texture of a Jackson Pollack. Finally, the
software is entirely dependent on the algorithm that it
implements.33 If that algorithm were changed to reflect a
different weighting of the novelty versus influence factors, its
output results would shift, as well. If the algorithm reflected an
entirely different definition of creativity—one which did not
value influence, for example—then the results would change in
still other ways.
This complication flows from a more
fundamental concern—by reducing creativity to so many specks
on a numerically-bound scatterplot, the creativity software
provides a single, supposedly objective answer to a question that
is almost hopelessly subjective. “Creativity” is a term of
inherent fluidity, whose meaning might legitimately vary as
between art scholars, art students, painters, judges, and
laypeople at a given historical moment, and as between aesthetic
31. See Elgammal & Saleh, supra note 1, at 39.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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notions accepted at different historical moments.
What
dominant thought in the Renaissance deemed “creative” might
look very different from that same notion as conceived now.
Upon closer investigation, then, what a computer posits as an
objective measure of creativity is no more than a single
subjective iteration bound by algorithm among potentially
infinite others that algorithms or human beings might espouse.
These issues do not just plague the search for creativity by
computers. In many similar ways, they contaminate the
creativity analyses currently used by courts. For now, let us
hypothetically consider a court standing in the place of the
computer program discussed here. At least at a superficial level,
the comparison has its points of resonance. Just as the computer
software cannot expand beyond the set of images made available
through scanning, so, too, must a court limit itself to the
evidence that is properly brought before it in litigation.34 A court
theoretically can no more speculate on what lies outside the
realm of admitted evidence than can a computer speculate on
images outside the realm of its database. Further, if a computer
can only apply the methods that it technologically embodies, a
court can only apply its own set of methodologies to the case at
hand. For purposes of the analogy here, the vision technology
limits that bound computational analysis become limits on
evidence and procedure when transplanted to a courtroom.
Finally, and by way of the ultimate methodological limit, the
court, like the computer, can only apply the definition of
creativity dictated by previous decisions. Here, the
programmer’s chosen definition, reliant on novelty and
influence, becomes the articulation of creativity espoused in
precedent by a given circuit court.
Admittedly, this comparison takes a highly mechanistic
view of courts. Courts are, of course, free to exercise a higher
degree of discretion in many cases where a computer program
running a simple algorithm cannot. Where the latter’s input

34. An appellate review often considers a district court’s decision “in light
of all the evidence” before the district court. Fisher v. Procter & Gamble Mfg.
Co., 613 F.2d 527, 540 (5th Cir. 1980). To require that evidence be brought
before the court is a simplification, however. Courts can take judicial notice of
adjudicative facts beyond those brought directly into evidence. FED. R. EVID.
201.
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entirely determines its output (presuming no unforeseen error,
defect, system failure, or bug), the former is tasked with making
an argument that might dynamically highlight certain aspects
of a given case’s facts or law to reach a decision in contradiction
with another court’s hypothetical application of the same law to
the same facts. That said, the almost Cartesian35 view of courts
proposed as a possibility here may be viewed as a hypothetical
comparison between the behavior of courts and computers. It is
one task of this Article to see if that hypothesis gains any
support in the practical legal world. This question is approached
not with an eye towards evidentiary or procedural practice, but
through the primary legal definition of creativity and its
constraints on a court’s methodology.
A review of judicial decisions is only the secondary goal of
this Article, however. The primary, but related, goal is to show
how the concept of “creativity” as defined and applied by courts
in copyright cases fails to map any reasonable concept of
creativity in certain critical respects. Accordingly, the first
charge undertaken here is a deconstructive one—to show the
lack of meaningful overlap between the legal definition of
creativity and the “actual” meanings of that same term. To
undertake this comparison, Part II of this Article focuses on
perhaps the more easily determined of these two definitions of
the term—“creativity” as defined by courts. Rather than giving
an unduly broad berth to this analysis, however, the Article will
limit its review to creativity as applied in the context of Feistbased threshold creativity reviews. As a matter of further
distillation, such cases will be highlighted where courts rely on
an alternatives-based test to find creativity.
This very
commonly-applied test dictates that a creator’s work is creative
under copyright if she enjoyed sufficient alternative means of
communicating the idea underlying her work. Part III of the
Article will show how the alternatives-based conception of
creativity—while perhaps well-meaning and successful in

35. To view a court’s function as mechanistically as here is to associate
that function with the method proposed by Descartes in books like his
MÉDITATIONS and DISCOURS DE LA MÉTHODE.
See RENÈ DESCARTES,
MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY (John Cottingham ed. & trans., Cambridge
University Press 1996) (1641); see RENE DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON METHOD
(Donald A. Cress trans., Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. 3d ed. 1998) (1637).
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promoting unrelated policy objectives—is ill-suited to measure
the presence of actual creativity.
This limited fit is
demonstrated, in part, via a Proustian hypothetical that reveals
inconsistent results between creativity according to courts and
creativity in literary practice. Part III also attempts to prove
such inconsistencies by drawing on scholarly legal literature on
the topic of creativity. Having completed a deconstruction of the
legal notion of “creativity,” part IV of this Article concludes on a
more constructive, if not wholly restructuring, note by invoking
a separate model of creativity that would seem to improve on the
views of courts and computers—a model indirectly proposed by
the Nobel laureate Bergson in his work The Creative Evolution,
among others.36 Although the Bergsonian model may not be
limited to rigid categorization, it focuses on creativity as a
function of indeterminacy in the creative process and its
embodied result. It is through just such a model that a more
accurate, if more fluid, view of the term “creativity” may be
conceived, in both general and copyrightable meanings of the
word.
Over the course of the three parts that follow, then, this
Article will trace the form of the first period of sine curve. It
begins here at an origin, a zero-point with no preconceived
notion of creativity. Part II builds from this point of origin by
constructing positively, ultimately reaching a peak by way of a
mature judicial conception of the term “creativity.” Part III
serves to undermine, deconstruct, and perhaps even raze Part
II’s judicially constructed edifice. It is thus the sine curve’s arc
falls below the imaginary x-axis to reach its nadir. Part IV
resurrects the curve with a proposed construction of creativity
that restores the system to something of an original point with
36. One might question why creativity should be read through the lens of
Bergson. Professor Roberta Kwall indirectly answers this question in The
Lessons of Living Gardens and Jewish Process Theology. Roberta R. Kwall,
The Lessons of Living Gardens and Jewish Process Theology, 14 VAND. J. ENT.
& TECH. L. 889 (2012) [hereinafter Living Gardens]. There, she specifically
highlights the propriety of a creativity analysis undertaken from the
perspective of Process Thought. Id. She comments that “the parallel [with
Process Thought] for human creativity is quite clear. Most human creators
experience the same type of ongoing evaluative process, resulting in works that
evolve and progress.” Id. at 900. As we shall see, the philosophy of Bergson
aligns fairly closely with the field of Process Thought, and accordingly
represents a valuable source for understanding creativity, as well.
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further growth envisaged. From there, the reader is left to
imagine additional cycles of growth and decay passing to the
infinite. It may be that through just such sinusoidal cycles of
varying amplitudes and frequencies, creativity in its non-legal
sense pulsates and flows, grows and shrinks, and bursts and
rests.
II. Creativity as Defined by Courts Applying Feist
The Feist Court’s mandate that works evidence a “modicum
of creativity” to merit copyright protection provided lower courts
with an immediate challenge. This challenge arose from a
curious combination of two factors in the case. On one hand, the
Supreme Court inaugurated a new creativity standard.37 On the
other, the Court denied that the artifact before it, the telephone
directory, possessed such creativity.38 This mismatch between
the Court’s new rule and its holding could be viewed as reducing
the vast majority of the Feist decision to the status of dictum.39
Clearly falling in this legally non-binding category are those
portions of the decision opining what constitutes sufficient
creativity. The work at issue did not possess such creativity due
to its “garden variety”40 nature; a work exceeding the new
standard was not before the Court such that the Court could
establish what aspects would enable the purely “garden variety”
to transition to the protectably creative. The problem then shifts
to a question of proof by negation—unless a given set not
meeting a criterion represents the whole set not meeting such a
criterion, the meaning of the affirmative rule cannot be inferred.
In other words, unless the telephone directory (and perhaps
others like it) represent the outer bounds of the “uncreative,” one
cannot deduce what is creative. Clearly, the Court did not
intend to limit its new rule to telephone directories; otherwise,
it would have denied copyright protection on the narrower
ground that the work at issue was an uncreative telephone
directory, not an uncreative work more generally. So a certain
37. Feist Publ’n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344 (1991).
38. Id. at 362.
39. Dennis Karjala, Copyright and Creativity, 15 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 169,
169 (2008).
40. Feist Publ’n, Inc., 499 U.S. at 362.
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space necessarily remains between the object determined
insufficiently creative—an iteration of traditionally standard
white pages—and the class of goods that are sufficiently
creative. What other objects that are at once insufficiently
creative and “not a white pages” accordingly remained
completely unclear after Feist.
Even if one is willing to afford some value to the non-binding
language in Feist, the decision still does not get very far in
advancing an affirmative definition of creativity. At one point,
the Court explains that “the requisite level of creativity is
extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice. The vast
majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they possess
some creative spark, no matter how crude, humble or obvious it
might be.”41 This language is plainly not a definition of the term
“creativity.” Instead, it is a statement unhelpfully establishing
a threshold level in the as-yet undefined term. Seen from this
perspective, this particular pronouncement would have lost no
effect if it had been articulated using any other concept. The
requisite level of “anarcho-syndicalist communism”42 would
have served just as well, if that term remained equally
undefined. Through the first sentence of this quotation, the
Court has provided a number without a yardstick. The second
sentence, far from providing such a yardstick, muddies efforts at
a possible definition. Reassurances that most works (none of
which were before the Court, of course) would satisfy the
undefined creativity standard merely restates the first
sentence’s problem, but the addition of the words “crude,
humble, or obvious” provide some rough substance by which
creativity might be defined as a fairly low bar. Yet the Court
also uses the term “creative spark,” which would seem to conjure
grander images of potentially Promethean creativity. So even
where the Court begins to give a somewhat wispy form to the
creativity requirement, it does so equivocally, in arguable selfcontradiction. And as commentators have further noted, the
Court provides no guidance elsewhere in the decision as to what
a “creative spark” might mean.43 It is fair to view the case as the
41. Id. at 345.
42. See MONTY PYTHON AND THE HOLY GRAIL (Michael White Productions
1975) for a use of a form of this term.
43. Clifford, supra note 26, at 268.
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implementation of a new standard without a “workable
definition” of what that standard might be.44
This has left lower courts with a certain degree of freedom
to interpret the Feist creativity standard in different ways; and
the results have been, perhaps unsurprisingly, divergent. To
demonstrate this divergence, further background is necessary.
Let us begin prior to the Feist decision, with a bedrock principle
of copyright that serves as a mediating term in later creativity
analyses. This principle is the “idea-expression dichotomy,”
which dictates, in its simplest terms, that ideas remain
uncopyrightable while the expression of those ideas may be
susceptible to copyright protection.45 For example, the “idea” of
sculpture of a deer is not protectable, but a particular sculptor’s
iteration of this would be.46 This summary of the ideaexpression dichotomy is deceptively simple, and a good bit more
texture is necessary to explain the doctrine’s subtleties. Perhaps
the most typically cited description of the dichotomy comes from
Learned Hand in the case of Nichols v. Universal Pictures,
Corp.,47 a case involving a play by the plaintiff entitled “Abie’s
Irish Rose,” alleged to have been infringed by a later motion
picture “The Cohens and the Kellys.”48 Because the case did not
involve the literal taking of any dialogue of the original work,
the court was compelled to consider the similarities of the works
at an abstract level. This it did according to the following
general idea/expression framework:
[U]pon any work . . ., a great number of patterns
of increasing generality will fit equally well, as
more and more of the incident is left out. The last
44. Id. at 279-80. See also Russ VerSteeg, Rethinking Originality, 34 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 801, 822 (1993) (“What the Court failed to do in Feist was
explain just how it determined that Rural's white pages lacked the creativity
requisite to elevate it to ‘original’ status for purposes of copyright.”).
45. This principle is codified within the Copyright Act, which states that
“[i]n no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend
to any idea…” 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012).
46. Superior Form Builders, Inc. v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co.,
Inc., 74 F.3d 488, 492 (4th Cir. 1996) ("Several sculptors may copy a deer, even
the same deer, in creating a sculpture, and each may obtain copyright
protection for his or her own expression of the original.").
47. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
48. Id. at 120.
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may perhaps be no more than the most general
statement of what the play is about, and at times
might consist only of its title; but there is a point
in this series of abstractions where they are no
longer protected, since otherwise the playwright
would prevent use of his ‘ideas’ to which, apart
from their expression, his property is never
extended.49
Because the two dramatic works at issue only overlapped to
the extent that they were comedies based upon both a quarrel
between ethnically diverse families and the love that two of the
families’ children develop despite the quarrel, the elements
allegedly taken fell on the unprotected “idea” side of Hand’s
framework.50 As such, no infringement was found.
At first glance, this test is of fairly limited value. It basically
says that there are things called “ideas,” to which copyright
protection does not extend, that are more general or abstract
versions of a given work. And then there is a separate class of
things called “expression,” which may be protected, that are
more concrete in nature. Somewhere between these two ends of
a spectrum from general to specific, protection begins to vest,
although that point is not clear.51
It is at this point of limited clarity that one iteration of the
idea/expression dichotomy, called the merger doctrine, might
meaningfully guide discussion. The merger doctrine refers to
the possibility that idea and expression might merge in a single
work, such that they become effectively indistinguishable. In
such a case, the unprotectability of an idea trumps the
protectability of expression. For example, in Veeck v. S. Bldg.
Code Congress Int’l,52 the appellee developed model fire and gas
codes for buildings, which the appellant copied to his web site.53
Between the creation and subsequent copying of the model
codes, however, certain towns in north Texas adopted the codes
49. Id. at 121.
50. Id. at 122.
51. “Nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can.”
Id. at 121.
52. Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Congress Int’l, 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002).
53. Id. at 793.
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as their own law.54 Because the appellant who copied the codes
presented them as the law of the Texas towns on his web site,
the court found that the appellant was copying no more than law
not properly subject to copyright. Once the model business codes
were adopted, in other words, they merged with the law of the
towns in question.55 If someone—including the appellant—
wished to cite to that law, that person needed access to the exact
expression embodied in the law.56 So what began as creative
expression by the appellee fundamentally changed in character
when it became law, for the idea of a north Texas building code
merges with the expression of that code.
Underpinning this finding is a Lockean policy objective. The
protectability of expression must yield to the unprotectability of
idea when the two merge because to find otherwise would
deprive the public domain of necessary expressive tools. As the
Veeck court noted, the appellant web site operator “could not
express the enacted law in any other way.”57 What matters in
the merger inquiry are the number of expressive alternatives
available to articulate a given idea. In Veeck, there were no such
alternatives to cite to a legal document. In other cases, a paucity
of expressive alternatives has served to deny protection to a map
of a fixed pipeline route,58 scented candle labels depicting the
fruits and flowers whose odors were captured in the candle
scents,59 and a set of basic box top instructions,60 among others.
To allow copyright in works amenable to so few expressive
alternatives would mean that subsequent cartographers, candle
makers, and box top designers could not express basic ideas
necessary to their trade without infringing another’s copyright.
This violates the basic Lockean principle where property rights
are acceptable as long as alternatives to the property are
“enough, and as good.”61 Merger cases present a scenario where
54. Id.
55. Id. at 802.
56. Id. at 801.
57. Id. at 802.
58. Kern River Gas Transmission Co. v. Coastal Corp., 899 F.2d 1458 (5th
Cir. 1990).
59. Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25 (1st Cir.
2001).
60. Morrisey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967).
61. Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C.
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there are neither enough ways to express an idea, nor other ways
that are as good.
This same Lockean reasoning leads to a contrary result in
copyright cases where an idea admits of sufficient expressive
alternatives. The recent copyright dispute pitting technology
giants Google and Oracle offers one example of this.62 The case
concerned Google’s unlicensed implementation of Oracle’s Java
programming language in Android phones.63 Google adopted an
argument not very different from the appellant in Veeck, where
Google’s purported need to use Java replaced the Veeck
appellant’s need to use the building code. The Oracle court was
not sympathetic to Google’s post hoc merger argument, however.
The court instead commented that “copyrightability is focused
on the choices available to the plaintiff at the time the computer
program was created,”64 not at a later time when a subsequent
user wishes to copy the program. In the Oracle case, such
choices were evident in the various ways that Oracle (or its
predecessor Java author, Sun Microsystems) could have
expressed the various functions accomplished by Java and
copied by Google. Indeed, “Google could have structured
Android differently and could have chosen different ways to
express and implement the functionality that it copied.”65
Because Google enjoyed alternatives that were both “enough”
and “as good,” copyright protection could properly subsist in
Oracle’s expression.
The cases outlined to this point serve to highlight two
critical aspects of the idea-expression dichotomy. First, they
provide a view—albeit introductory—as to what an “idea” is. An
idea is a general statement of a work’s (or a subpart of a work’s)
subject matter or aim—to provide a citation to a building code,
to map a pipeline route, to communicate candle scents visually,
or to implement certain functionality in a computer language.
But as Learned Hand’s initial statement intimated, there
remains some flexibility in the generality or specificity of an
DAVIS L. REV. 1151, 1171 (2007) [hereinafter Creativity and Culture in
Copyright Theory].
62. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
63. Id. at 1347-48, 1350-51.
64. Id. at 1370.
65. Id. at 1368.
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idea, without a clear definition as to when a move towards
specificity converts the idea to expression. The idea in the Veeck
case could be recast more specifically as a citation to the specific
building code of two towns in North Texas. This would not have
altered the outcome of the case, as merger occurs in either
articulation of the idea offered here; but the move towards a
more specific idea does not seem per se unreasonable. One can
imagine a similar change in a case like Oracle. The idea there
might not be to implement certain functionality in a computer
language, but, hypothetically, to implement a cloning function
in an object-oriented programming language using certain
declarations required by that language. The dividing line
between idea and expression would seem mobile, indeed.
The mobility in the line between idea and expression might
present enough of a challenge on its own, but the idea/expression
dichotomy features a second, critical complication. Essentially,
the dividing line between idea and expression does not just
demarcate idea and expression, it determines their interplay in
what could be compared to the two-body problem in physics.
This latter problem considers the dynamic forces exerted
between two bodies in space. When the bodies move in space, it
is not enough to measure the change in force exercised by one on
the other; one must consider how the bodies dynamically
exchange force in an ever-changing feedback loop. There is a
similarly dynamic feedback loop in play between idea and
expression when the line dividing one from the other moves.
One could consider the hypothetical change in idea for the Oracle
case proposed above as one example of this. The much-criticized
case of Whelan Assocs. Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc.,66 offers
another.
There, the court confronted an accusation of
infringement in certain dental management software,67 but the
overlap between the software programs at issue was limited to
the programs’ shared structure and functionality, not their
actual source or object code.68 The court thus had to determine
if copyrightable expression could subsist at a level of generality
above the literal form of software code. To structure this
66. Whelan Assocs. Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir.
1986).
67. Id. at 1224.
68. Id. at 1233-34.
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analysis, the court concluded that “the line between idea and
expression may be drawn with reference to the end sought to be
achieved by the work in question.”69 The idea of “a computerized
program for operating a dental laboratory would not in and of
itself be subject to copyright,”70 while copyright could extend to
the court’s conception of expression for software - “the manner
in which the program operates, controls and regulates the
computer in receiving, assembling, calculating, retaining,
correlating, and producing useful information either on a screen,
print-out or by audio communication.”71 This concept of
expression followed directly from the court’s conclusion that
there were “many ways”72 that a computer program could
perform this set of functions. Setting aside whether the Whelan
court’s approach is correct, it may be observed that it established
an extremely broad idea level when reviewing the software
before it. That choice had the practical effect of allowing
expression to climb into higher levels of abstraction because its
“idea” standard allowed for expressive alternatives at those
levels. So a very general definition of “idea” does not just move
a line of demarcation between idea and expression, it feeds more
and more alternatives into those levels of abstraction more
specific than that idea.73 The “idea” crosses the very territorial
boundary that it establishes. The hypothetical example offered
regarding the Oracle case would have precisely the opposite
effect. As the idea of the functionality implemented in the Java
language became more specific, fewer alternatives would be
available at more and more specific levels of abstraction, thereby

69. Id. at 1236.
70. Id. at 1238.
71. Id. at 1239.
72. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1238.
73. A different way of putting this appears in Lexmark Int’l., Inc. v. Static
Control Components, where the court concluded that certain copier codes were
not copyrightable. Lexmark Int’l., Inc. v. Static Control Components, 387 F.3d
522 (6th Cir. 2004). In this respect, it faulted the district court’s previous
finding of alternatives in the codes by noting that the possible use of other
constants in the codes “do not appear to represent alternative means of
expressing the ideas or methods of operations embodied in the Toner Loading
Program; they appear to be different ideas or methods of operation altogether.”
Id. at 540. Thus, by constricting the scope of the idea, potentially copyrightable
alternatives were displaced from the space of protectable expression to the
space of unprotected idea. This will be discussed more later in this Section.
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doubly constricting the scope of copyright in a dynamic feedback
loop. Idea, viewed from this angle, serves both as line of
demarcation to be distinguished from expression, and constraint
that enters expression’s territory and applies a dynamically
changing force.
The functioning of the idea/expression dichotomy is of
critical importance in the question of copyrightable creativity
under Feist because it drives a methodological distinction
between those courts that view the creativity inquiry as an
extension of the idea/expression dichotomy and those that view
the creativity inquiry as an entirely unrelated condition.
Perhaps the best example of the first approach comes from the
opinion in American Dental Ass’n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass’n.74
In that case, the Seventh Circuit dealt with the purported
infringement of American Dental’s taxonomy of dental
procedures, comprised of both descriptions and serial numbers.75
Delta Dental, which had copied most of American’s system in its
own publication, defended in part on the ground that the
taxonomy in question was not properly copyrightable.76 The
Seventh Circuit disagreed with this contention, noting:
Classification is a creative endeavor. Butterflies
may be grouped by their color, or the shape of
their wings, or their feeding or breeding habits, or
their habitats, or the attributes of their
caterpillars, or the sequence of their DNA; each
scheme of classification could be expressed in
multiple ways. Dental procedures could be
classified by complexity, or by the tools necessary
to perform them, or by the parts of the mouth
involved, or by the anesthesia employed, or in any
of a dozen different ways. The Code’s descriptions
don’t ‘merge with the facts’ any more than a
scientific description of butterfly attributes is part
of a butterfly. There can be multiple, and equally
original, biographies of the same person’s life, and
74. Am. Dental Ass’n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass’n, 126 F.3d 977 (7th Cir.
1997).
75. Id. at 977.
76. Id. at 978.
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multiple original taxonomies of a field of
knowledge. Creativity marks the expression even
after the fundamental scheme has been devised.77
The court’s citation to Feist immediately prior to this,
coupled with its use of the word “creative” within the paragraph,
clarifies that its comments do relate to the question of
copyrightable creativity. Confusion as to the comments’ scope
would be understandable, however. After all, the court mentions
the non-creativity-informed doctrine of merger directly. Its
reasoning is also thoroughly consonant with the structure of
traditional idea/expression inquiries. When the court lists
possible ways in which dental procedures could be classified, it
is implicitly setting out an idea—the classification of dental
procedures. When it subsequently enumerates criteria by which
the classification could be organized—complexity, tools, or
anesthesia—it is generating a list of alternatives available based
on the initial choice of idea. The court then repeats the exercise
in dictum with another example—that of the ‘idea” of a
biography permitting the “expression” in the form of multiple
alternatives.78
77. Id. at 979 (internal citation omitted).
78. That an alternatives-based test for copyrightable creativity is more or
less equivalent to the traditional idea-expression determination is entirely
consistent with the computer software infringement methodology described in
Computer Association International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc. Computer Assoc. Int’l,
Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992). In that case, the court adopted
the so-called abstraction-filtration-comparison method to determine if a later
piece of computer software infringed an earlier program. Id. The Second
Circuit described its test as follows:
In ascertaining substantial similarity under this approach, a
court would first break down the allegedly infringed program
into its constituent structural parts. Then, by examining each
of these parts for such things as incorporated ideas,
expression that is necessarily incidental to those ideas, and
elements that are taken from the public domain, a court
would then be able to sift out all non-protectable material.
Left with a kernel, or possible kernels, of creative expression
after following this process of elimination, the court's last
step would be to compare this material with the structure of
an allegedly infringing program.
Id. at 706. As the court’s description and name of the test’s first step suggest,
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The reading of Feist’s creativity standard in a manner
coextensive with the traditional idea/expression inquiry raises
two immediate complications.79 The first is an extension of an
issue noted above—the two body problem of idea and expression.
The court’s statements on butterflies, bicuspids, and biographies
imply the determination of specific idea levels, but there is no
reason to view these as the only possible idea levels. The court
could have imagined the idea of each falling at a more specific
point, like “butterflies grouped by color,” “dental procedures
grouped by complexity,” or the “biography of Urkel.”80 Each of
these more specific idea choices would entail an associated
constriction in the number of alternatives available to a creator
acting on that idea. Such more specific ideas would inevitably
affect the scope of a work’s copyright; and if articulated in a
sufficiently specific manner, they could go so far as to deprive a
work of copyright entirely. It would seem that the Seventh
Circuit played somewhat fast and loose with this (inherently fast
and loose) aspect of the creativity question.
The second immediate complication of the American Dental
court’s analysis is a question of redundancy. Among the set of
examples that the court offers to justify its holding of
copyrightability in the dental taxonomy, a citation to Whelan v.
Jaslow would be by no means out of place. The idea of “a
computerized program for operating a dental laboratory,”81 like
a taxonomy of butterflies, would not be copyrightable, but the
chosen expression of each among available alternatives could be.
Yet the rationale in Whelan was not based on Feist; it could not
be, as Feist was decided five years after Whelan. This leads to
the conclusion that the American Dental approach to creativity
the court begins by employing Learned Hand’s abstraction method as a first
step to separate idea from expression in a piece of software. It then filters out
idea and other unprotected expression, such as content completely constrained
by programming language or other external factor (in other words, which have
no alternative means of expression). What remains, as the court notes, are
“kernels of creative expression,” whose creativity inherently subsists in the
alternatives available to express the kernels’ content. Id.
79. With additional criticisms to follow in Part III.
80. Such a biography would presumably have at least one chapter
dedicated to cheese. For more on this reference, please refer to the sitcom
Family Matters (ABC television broadcast 1989-1997).
81. Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1307, 1320
(E.D. Pa. 1985)
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is not just consistent with the traditional idea/expression
analysis, it is duplicative of it. The very idea constraint leading
to alternative expressive possibilities necessary to satisfy the
idea/expression dichotomy in Whelan operates in American
Dental to show creativity. This does not seem a proper approach
to the question of creativity, if only because it is inconsistent
with the approach and methodology of the Supreme Court in
Feist. When considering the white pages before it in the latter
case, the Court did not conclude that the idea of a white pages
directory merged with the expression of that directory,82 such
that the traditional idea/expression analysis would dispose of
the case (and it certainly could have done so, for there are no
alternatives to the traditional white pages format). Instead, the
Court initiated a new requirement which, it should be presumed,
meant something more than the old one.
Other cases that rely on an idea/expression structure for
their own Feist-based inspiration address the risk of redundancy
in tests by adding a new element to the old test: author selection
or arrangement. Here, the Article will take a brief turn to a
“meta” level by rehashing Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. v. West
Pub. Co.,83 a case involving the copyrightability of various
aspects of West case reporters so beloved by attorneys
everywhere. Because cases themselves are in the public domain,
West’s claims to copyright were limited to those aspects of the
reporter that they selected, in this case the content of the header
at the top of each case.84 To guide its analysis, the court
commented that “when it comes to the selection or arrangement
of information, creativity inheres in making non-obvious choices
from among more than a few options.”85 So it is already clear
that the court would not limit itself to the typical idea-expression
search for alternatives, it required a non-obvious selection from
among those alternatives. While the use of the patent term
“non-obvious” is probably inappropriate in view of Feist, it does
add a probabilistic shading to the basic alternatives test. Rather
than viewing all alternatives as equally likely, and merely
82.
(1991).
83.
84.
85.

See generally Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340
Bender & Co., Inc. v. West Pub. Co., 158 F.3d 674 (2d Cir. 1998).
Id. at 683-85.
Id. at 682.
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tallying them to find possible copyrightability in each, the
Matthew Bender court seems to require both a tallying and a
related assessment of likelihood to find copyright in only those
alternatives that are “non-obvious.” The case also highlights the
additional wrinkle that the alternative be chosen by the author
among the others. This analytical framework led the court to
find that West’s various contributions to case headers were all
insufficiently creative to merit copyright protection.86 The court
acknowledged other cases where such creativity had been found,
but emphasized the “exercise of judgments more evaluative and
creative” than West’s.87
It is doubtful, however, that the addition of a light
probabilistic shading and an emphasis on a creator’s judgment
and selection will meaningfully change the original
idea/expression quantum in Feist creativity cases. On the issue
of probability, it should be recalled the scènes à faire doctrine
already puts just such a light probabilistic shading in the
traditional idea/expression context. The doctrine accomplishes
this by finding uncopyrightable, or at best of limited
copyrightability, those expressions effectively generic or
inherent to a work’s genre.88 An annoying and meddlesome
neighbor on a sitcom would be one example of this phenomenon;
the use of a parrot, eyepatch, and peg-leg for a pirate character
would be another. The core of the scènes à faire doctrine, then,
is to find more probable forms of expression, and then eliminate
or limit their protectability, in much the same way the modifier
“non-obvious” would attach to less probable, and accordingly
protectable, forms of expression. So the Bender inquiry into the
86. Id. at 688-89.
87. Id. at 689.
88. See, e.g., Incredible Tech. v. Virtual Tech., 284 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 107980 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (acknowledging in the context of competing golf video games
that certain aspects of such a game may be subject to very thin copyright
protection—“the wind meter and club selection features, for example, account
for variables in a real game of golf and are indispensable to an accurate video
representation of the sport. The game selection features, such as the menu
screens and player quit options, are standard to the video arcade game format,
as is the fixed placement of certain icons around the border of the screen. . . .
Though these elements are protected at least in their ‘shapes, sizes, colors,
sequences, and arrangements,’ like the graphics on the control panel, they are
to be treated as scenes a faire, and are afforded protection only from virtually
identical copying.”).
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probability of a given alternative would not seem to change the
traditional idea/expression quantum.
The second supplement to the traditional idea/expression
query proposed by the Bender case—author selection or
judgment—would not seem to add very much to the test either.
This much can be shown in practical terms. As a baseline
postulate for this statement, copyright must require no more
than that authorial selection or arrangement happen at one
time, any time in the creative process. To conclude otherwise
would eliminate copyright in well-timed photography, like
Alfred Eisenstaedt’s famous shot of the sailor spontaneously
kissing a woman in jubilation at the end of World War II.89
Eisenstaedt clearly merited copyright for his well-timed shot,
but he did not arrange anything at the time of the photograph.
He merely exercised limited choice in pointing his camera, took
the photograph and at a point sometime later selected it as
worthy of adoption as his work. If copyright is to protect
Eisenstaedt’s work (as it should), it must, on occasion, accept a
limited quantity and quality of artistic selection. Such selection
may be no more than a post hoc act of adoption of an
unintentionally created work.90 Most works will easily surpass
this threshold, leaving the alternatives test, and not authorial
selection, a dominant rudder in the space of many Feist-based
creativity analyses.91 And if the alternatives test assumes such
a role, then judicial assessment of creativity is necessarily
89. This photograph is entitled V-J Day in Times Square.
90. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951)
(finding unintentional muscular twitches could result in copyrightable
authorship). See also Laura Heymann, A Tale of (at Least) Two Authors:
Focusing Copyright Law on Process Over Product, 34 J. CORP. L. 1009, 1015
(2009).
The individual who accidentally creates ‘art’ through an
involuntary mark on a paper or by spilling paint on a nearby
canvas cannot, of course, have been motivated to do so by any
incentives provided by the law. To the extent she is motivated
at all, it is at the time of adoption of the work-the decision to
call it one's ‘art’ rather than simply to discard it as trash.
Id.
91. One exception to this might be the use of computers to generate
content without additional authorial choice. See Random Numbers, supra note
26, at 295.
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subject to the two issues already noted above—inherent
unpredictability according to a court’s determination of a work’s
“idea,” and almost complete redundancy with previously existing
modes of analysis. It would seem that it is a court’s choice of
idea and expressive alternatives, and not an author’s choice in
expression, that matters most in the judicial assessment of
creativity.
The alternatives-based analysis of creativity under Feist
presents further issues, which will be discussed in part III; but
for now we would do well to introduce a few cases that view the
Feist creativity inquiry as entirely separate from the
alternatives-based analysis. One such case is ATC Distribution
Group, Inc. v. Whatever It Takes Transmission,92 involving the
alleged copying of a parts catalog by the defendant’s founder
after leaving the plaintiff’s employ.93 That this case treats the
Feist inquiry as divergent from the idea/expression inquiry can
be shown through the court’s comment that “original and
creative ideas are not copyrightable.”94 A test for creativity that
aligns with the traditional idea/expression analysis cannot make
this comment, for creativity can only be found where there are
sufficient expressive alternatives at an abstraction level more
specific than a work’s idea. The Whatever It Takes court further
rejects a consistent reading of creativity and the idea/expression
test when it acknowledged that the parts catalog at issue could
have been arranged in alternative ways, yet the existence of
such alternatives was insufficient to render the catalog
creative.95 Yet the Whatever It Takes court, like the Feist court
before it, provides almost no substance to its alternate
understanding of copyrightable creativity. When opining that
the catalog embodied “creative ideas,” the court immediately
shifted to a regurgitation of the section 102(b) prohibitions on
copyright, not an explanation as to why the ideas at issue were
creative, but the expression thereof was not.96 When dismissing
the catalog’s part numbers as uncreative, the court rejected
92. ATC Distrib. Grp., Inc. v. Whatever It Takes Transmission, 402 F.3d
700 (6th Cir. 2005).
93. Id. at 702-03.
94. Id. at 707 (emphasis in original).
95. Id. at 712.
96. Id. at 707.
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copyright on the basis of randomness in the selection of parts
numbers.97
The remaining copyright inquiries—on the
arrangement of the catalog and the catalog’s illustrations—
offered no additional creativity in the court’s estimation, and the
court offered little to no more guidance as to why it reached its
result.98
Other courts do only slightly better on the issue.99 Some
focus more on the selection question already discussed above.100
In Warren Pub., Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp., for example, the
court focused on choice among a universe of possible choices in
the context of cable television directory.101 Yet this looks an
awful lot like the alternatives-based methodology already
discussed above.102 The court in Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor
Sales U.S.A., Inc.103 highlighted the intent of the creator when
considering 2-D digital depictions of originally 3-D Toyota
cars.104 Yet intent seems something like a light spin on choice
which, further, might not be amenable to many useful
applications. For one, intent sometimes fails to execute its
vision in a final product, as in the notable Alfred Bell & Co. v.

97. Id. at 709.
98. Whatever It Takes, 402 F.3d at 710-13.
99. Mandel, supra note 17, at 326 (“Judicial opinions, in fact, rarely even
try to describe the artistic creative process, presumably because it is considered
so ineffable. When opinions do describe authorial creativity they default to
traditional right-brain artist conceptions, for instance, referring to ‘the
mysterious ebb and flow of an artist's creative powers’ or an ‘intrinsically
individualistic’ process.”).
100. Key Publ’ns, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ’g Enters., Inc., 945 F.2d
509, 513 (2d Cir. 1991).
101. Warren Publ’g., Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp., 115 F.3d 1509 (11th Cir.
1997).
102. So, too, does the case of William A. Graham Co. v. Haughey, although
with a slight twist. William A. Graham Co. v. Haughey, 430 F. Supp. 2d 458
(E.D. Pa. 2006). There, the insurance form under scrutiny was deemed
sufficiently creative under Feist because it was found to feature “numerous
creative differences” in comparison to another similar form. Id. at 466.
Comparison to other similar artifacts, it might be a more concrete way of
demonstrating the presence of creative content, yet it is functionally equivalent
to the alternatives test for the obvious reason that it relies on such
alternatives.
103. Meshworks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258
(10th Cir. 2008).
104. Id. at 1266.
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Catalda Fine Arts, Inc. case,105 where exact replica engravings
of famous art pieces could reflect the copyist engraver’s
muscular twitch that contradicted the intent of the project (and
merited copyright).106 Intent also seems most useful only in
those disputes where creative intent is clear. Such was the case
in the Meshwerks case, as the 2-D digital depictions were
intended to be nothing more than exact replicas of Toyota cars.107
Creative intent is rarely so unambiguous or single-minded,
however.
Perhaps the best approach to creativity as an alternative to
the alternatives-based query is that of then-Judge Alito’s dicta
in Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp.,108 where the Third Circuit
considered the copyrightability of parts numbers. Because of the
part-numbering plaintiff’s reliance on an analogy between its
creation and photography, Judge Alito felt it necessary to
distinguish the cases:
The Southco numbers convey information about a
few objective characteristics of mundane products
— for example, that a particular screw is oneeighth of an inch in length. A photographic
portrait, by contrast, does not simply convey
information about a few objective characteristics
of the subject but may also convey more complex
and indeterminate ideas.109
In Alito’s view, creativity is a movement away from the
merely functional and the accurate in representation in favor of
greater complexity and indeterminacy.
Nowhere are
alternatives to be found in this dicta. The work and its own
complexity and indeterminacy are the point of inquiry. This may
not be a full-fledged methodology, inasmuch as the court did not
particularly apply it to the parts numbers at issue, nor explain
how to discern the presence or necessary amount of complexity
105. Alfred Bell & Co. Ltd. v. Catalada Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d
Cir. 1951).
106. Id. at 105.
107. Meshwerks, Inc., 528 F.3d at 1270.
108. Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2004).
109. Id. at 284.
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and indeterminacy. Yet there is much to commend it, as it
presents a sketch of creativity that does not answer to a
distinction between ideas and expression. The test’s very
indeterminacy, if not amenable to completely predictable
judicial decision-making as articulated, would allow a court the
liberty to seek creativity in its many forms, not just through its
genesis as an alternative among others answering to a single
idea. Judge Alito seems to be on to something with his view of
creativity in Southco, and we will return to another view much
like it when Part IV considers the philosopher Henri Bergson’s
view of creativity. But first, Part III will pursue the critique of
the alternatives-based creativity standard.
III. The Alternatives-Based Test as an Inaccurate Reflection of
Creativity
Longtemps, je me suis couché de bonne heure.110
So begins Marcel Proust’s novel (or series of novels), A la
recherche du temps perdu.111 The line might be translated as,
“For a long time, I went to bed early,” and it initiates a
monolithic story following the narrator as he negotiates his
relationships with his mother, Swann, and many other notable
characters. Setting aside the overwhelming suite to this incipit,
one can begin to situate its importance on a smaller scale. The
noted semiotician Roland Barthes views this sentence as an
opening for the first episode of the novel, where the work

110. MARCEL PROUST, DU CÔTÉ DE CHEZ SWANN 3 (1988).
111. I have left the title of the opus in its original French for almost the
same reason that I have left the first line unchanged. The translations of the
title into English -- most typically, In Search of Lost Time or In Remembrance
of Things Past—leave something to be desired. The former most closely tracks
the literal meaning of the title, but even that sacrifices an additional meaning
of “temps perdu” (literally, “lost time”). To do something à temps perdu in
French is to do it in one’s spare time. So the “lost time” of the first translation
also has a connotation of “spare time”—Proust seeks not just the past, but a
certain excess. A second, but related, reason for leaving Proust’s title
untranslated follows from the title of this very Article. For in this Article, I am
in search of something lost—not time (le temps), but meaning (le sens), and
more specifically, the lost meaning of the term “creativity” in the context of
copyright. There is equally something excessive sought here, a spare meaning
of creativity beyond that found in courts.
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meditates on sleep.112 Sleep, for Barthes, is the organizational
mode of Proust’s originality; yet in so organizing his work, the
author actually disorganizes it.113 Proust’s narrator, by invoking
sleep as a theme of his work, introduces a “false conscience,” a
conscience that is “off-kilter, vacillating, intermittent.”114
Through this conscience, the very “logical shell of Time is
attacked,”115 and no strict chronological ordering is possible.
This worthwhile reading of Proust’s first sentence goes a long
way to showing how Proust was creative in the context of the
fifty pages (and then, by extension, several thousand more) that
followed this first line.
Yet I would argue that Proust’s creativity can be situated on
an even more microscopic scale—that of the sentence itself. The
sentence is actually quite unusual, the commonplace tenor of the
translation notwithstanding. To demonstrate this, here must
intrude a brief explanation of the grammatical structure of the
sentence, along with some additional background on French
grammar more typically. The oddity of the sentence flows from
the choice of verb tense, le passé composé, or simple past,
typically used to describe discrete events. This tense functions
in French in the same manner as the past tense in English when
a list of past events is narrated. The passé composé would be
used for all three verbs in a translation of: “I went to the movies;
I saw a movie; I came home.” The French have a second primary
past tense,116 l’imparfait, or imperfect, which describes past
states that have a certain ongoing duration. For an example of
the equivalent in English, the verbs in the following would be
translated to the imperfect in French—“I was happy,” or “I used
to go to the movies.” In his sentence above, Proust is invoking
an activity that should have had a duration requiring use of the
imperfect. Instead of “I used to go to the movies,” he seems to
mean, “I used to go to bed early.” Yet he did not use the
imperfect in the sentence to express this [je me couchais de bonne

112. ROLAND BARTHES, LE BRUISSEMENT DE LA LANGUE 336 (Editions du
Seuil 1984).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 337.
115. Id.
116. There are other past tenses in French, in particular, the passé simple
and the plus que parfait, but they are not relevant here.
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heure]; he used the passé composé. What took place for a “long
time” is something that he has collapsed to form a single discrete
event. The logical shell of time is broken, indeed, but one need
not look to the fifty pages that follow this opening line to prove
it. By altering something as simple as a single past tense to use
a form that no one normally would, Proust has infused a single
sentence with a remarkable dynamism in its complexity and
seeming contradiction.
The sentence is not just dynamic, though; it is plainly
creative. Supporting this conclusion is Ralph Clifford’s similar
showing of creativity on a small scale through the example of the
phrase “couch potato.”117 While “couch potato” has become an
entirely typical slang saying, Clifford comments that there could
be no “formulaic and deterministic transformation” that would
lead to the combination of the words “couch” and “potato.”118
Further, Clifford detected no repeatable process that would
result in the phrase.119 The same indicia could equally apply to
Proust’s sentence, where the shift in verb tense evades the
formulaic and deterministic, and the probable in process, to
achieve a high degree of creativity. And to an even greater
degree than the simple metaphor “couch potato,” Proust’s
sentence manipulates the very conceptual basis of both his
sentence and his work at large. That must qualify as creative.
Here points up the first of a number of additional
methodological problems with the alternatives-based test for
creativity under Feist. Beyond the issues discussed above - the
test’s potential redundancy vis-à-vis the idea/expression
dichotomy and its inherent flexibility in selecting a point of
demarcation between idea and expression, the test suffers from
the drawback that it depends on the presence of alternatives to
show creativity. In the case of Proust’s sentence, a court could
easily conclude that there are almost no alternatives whatsoever
for the expressive choice that Proust made. This would merely
require that the court deem the sentence’s idea “a statement
that one went to bed early,” or something of similar specificity.
While the nature of the idea/expression dichotomy admits of
certain mobility of the “idea” in the direction of generality, a
117. Random Numbers, supra note 26, at 274.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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court would likely hesitate to assign an idea as general as “an
opening sentence in a book” or “a sentence about sleep.” To do
so would result in the potential copyrightability of an enormous
number of sentences that should not merit copyright
protection—like “Call me Ishmael”120 or “she likes to sleep.”
Neither of these sentences should be copyrightable, lest
fundamental communicative tools be appropriated by a single
copyright holder. Indeed, a court’s need to foreclose copyright in
the standard imperfect-tense form of Proust’s sentence—
longtemps je me couchais de bonne heure—would require that
the court create an idea more or less coextensive with this
standard form. Once the idea is so defined, Proust’s highly
creative sentence is just another alternative of its distinctly
uncreative analogue.
Further search for alternatives proves fruitless given an
idea definition the likes of “a statement that one went to bed
early.”121 The words in the sentence cannot be meaningfully
reordered and still retain their meaning. Certain words in the
sentence have synonyms—de bonne heure could have been
replaced by tôt, for example—but these are very limited in
number.
Even allowing for the most generous range of
synonyms, there are not enough, or as good, to satisfy a Lockean
rationale. For lack of expressive alternatives, Proust’s highly
creative sentence would be deemed uncreative under a probable
application of the test espoused by the Delta Dental court and
others. This seems a plainly incorrect result.
Incorrect results would equally follow in the obverse case—
where the simple presence of alternatives suffices to show
copyrightable creativity when actual creativity is quite limited.
A reasonable example of this is the case of Kregos v. Associated

120. This is the first sentence of Herman Melville’s MOBY DICK, of course.
121. A court could reasonably go further in the direction of specificity in
the case of the Proust sentence, of course. Such a move would only further
garret the sentence’s creativity. As Professor Leslie Kurtz pointed out, what
makes a piece of poetry (she uses Keats) creative might reasonably be treated
as an idea, albeit a complex one. Leslie A. Kurtz, Speaking to the Ghost: Idea
and Expression in Copyright, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1221, 1228-29 (1992). In
view of this, copyright would not find alternatives where a phrase provides the
only articulation of a specific set of concepts. Proust’s sentence could fit within
this analysis.
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Press.122 The plaintiff Kregos created pitching stats forms for
baseball games and distributed them to news outlets.123 His
forms highlighted nine relevant pitching statistics for a given
pitching match-up. The appeal to the Second Circuit considered
whether copyright protection in Kregos’ selection of statistics
could be rejected as a matter of law. The court found that it
could not, reasoning:
Kregos could have selected past performances
from any number of recent starts, instead of using
the three most recent starts. And he could have
chosen to include strikeouts, walks, balks, or hit
batters. By consulting play-by-play accounts of
games, instead of box scores, he could have
counted various items such as the number of
innings in which the side was retired in order, or
in which no runner advanced as far as second
base. Or he could have focused on performance
under pressure by computing the percentage of
innings in which a runner scored out of total
innings in which a runner reached second base,
and he could have chosen to calculate this statistic
for any number of recent starts. In short, there are
at least scores of available statistics about
pitching performance available to be calculated
from the underlying data and therefore thousands
of combinations of data that a selector can choose
to include in a pitching form.124
It was in part this set of possible alternatives that enabled
the Second Circuit to accept the possibility of copyrightable
creativity in Kregos’ pitching forms. Yet it is not clear that a
chosen set of nine pitching statistics is particularly creative.
Perhaps it is sufficiently creative to satisfy Feist’s standard, but
in no way does the existence of lots of possible statistics render
a selection of a few among them creative. So where the highly

122. Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991).
123. Id. at 702.
124. Id. at 704.
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creative Proust might miss out on copyright for lack of
alternatives, less creative authors compiling stats tables might
receive copyright protection—and accordingly be deemed
creative—due to the simple presence of other alternatives. This,
too, seems an incorrect result.
There are still other issues with a test for creativity based
on choice among expressive alternatives. Barthes’ essay on the
first sentence of Proust provides an entry-point to one such
issue. It is in that writing that Barthes explains his
identification with Proust in his own personal desire to write a
novel.125 What unfolds here, then, is an interaction between
actors in what Professor Julie Cohen calls a “cultural
landscape.”126
This landscape is, in Cohen’s words, “a
distributed set of cultural resources”127 with which individuals
interact, including through creative processes. This concept
places more value on the human body128 as a mediator of creative
production. It is often through bodily interaction and access that
creativity occurs—through iterative process in communication
with cultural artifacts, and not as the result of an immediate
creative spark.129 This view of creativity has been endorsed
elsewhere. Michael Madison, for example, highlights the
“sometimes messy, unplanned, accidental, idiosyncratic nature
of creativity and creation” when discussing how Shakespeare
was known to have cribbed materials from cultural artifacts all
around him.130
For commentators like these, the critical myth that they aim
to debunk is that of the romantic author. This archetype posits
a creator, toiling away alone, immune to the buffeting of the
surrounding world, and creating something truly individual.
This creator is often described as drawing immediate
inspiration, in the form of a novel idea, through some odd
stimulus, like the rusty spinning of a weathervane or the mosaic
pattern in a kaleidoscope. Of course, the problem with these
125. See Barthes, supra note 112, at 333, 343-45.
126. Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, supra note 61, at 1180.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1181.
129. Id. at 1182.
130. Michael J. Madison, Comment, Where does Creativity Come From?
and Other Stories of Copyright, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 747, 760 (2003).
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myths is that they are just that—myths. While one cannot
disprove all such myths, one notable example might help paint
the picture more clearly. Isaac Newton, who is rightly revered
for his mechanical theories, fits clearly within this mythology,
as early twentieth century physicist Pierre Duhem
demonstrated. Duhem’s critique is coextensive with Cohen’s—
he faults the common person’s tendency to believe that scientific
inspiration (and quite probably, inspiration in general) happens
like a chicken hatching, or the touch of a magic wand to the
theorist’s head.131 He then proceeds to trace at length how
Newton answers to this flawed view of discovery. The common
myth conceives of Newton as having seen an apple fall in a field,
and having thereby immediately discovered his mechanical
laws.132 Nothing could be farther from the truth. Duhem
painstakingly133 shows, with a tracing of scientific history from
Ancient Greece through Newton’s contemporaries, that
Newton’s discovery had long been prepared. Consider Newton’s
gravitational equation, which measures force exerted between
two objects by multiplying their masses by a constant and
dividing that total by the square of the distance between the
objects.134 Duhem notes that the study of light had already
relied on a relation based on the inverse of a distance squared.
The physicist Halley, among others, was conducting work
relying on this very relation in the field of mechanics while
Newton performed his own work.135 Newton, meanwhile, did not
create his equation in an immediate flash.
His initial
development of the law of gravitation occurred in 1665; but due
to a widely accepted, but inaccurate, conception of the Earth’s
size, he was unable to apply the law to his satisfaction until the
inaccuracy cleared up . . . in 1682.136 So the falling apple myth
and the immediate development of a law from a single idea goes
right out the window. What remains is Duhem’s observation
131. PIERRE DUHEM, LA THÉORIE PHYSIQUE, SON OBJET, SA STRUCTURE 307
(J. Vrin. 2007).
132. Id.
133. Duhem devotes 45 pages to this history. See id. at 307-52.
134. This is represented mathematically as F = g*M1*M2/r2, where g is the
gravitational constant, the M’s are the masses of the objects, and r is the
distance between them.
135. Duhem, supra note 131, at 344.
136. Id. at 345.
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that the greatest ideas are often born of their time, as if “floating
in the air, carried by the wind from one country to another.”137
The
idea/expression
dichotomy—and
associated
alternatives-based test for copyrightable creativity—tend to
serve the image of the romantic author, however. By reducing
the point of comparison for expression and creativity to a
monolithic abstract idea, the author or creator who has such an
idea and then articulates it through individual expression is
well-served, for the test tracks exactly what this creator is doing.
The test is less effective for those creators, even great ones like
Newton, who wander in the wilderness for seventeen years
developing work in close collaboration with the theories of their
time. This failure of the alternatives-based test is part and
parcel of a certain binary that commentators like Professor
Cohen seek to debunk, that which divides the intellectual
property pirate from the romantic author. While creators may
undoubtedly be categorized along a spectrum from more original
to more derivative work, Cohen highlights creation as a process
that contains both internal and external, culturally-inspired
components.138 There is no simple binary between romantic
author and pirate.139
Other binaries hardwired into copyright law’s creativity
inquiry represent reasonable candidates for improvement.
Cohen also criticizes the dichotomy’s methodological bias
towards a natural rights versus economics binary.140 The former
model concerns itself with the sets of rights that an author or

137. Id. at 349.
138. Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, supra note 61, at 1178.
139. I would criticize Profs. Cohen and Madison for their failure to
recognize the entire spectrum of more original to more derivative work. Their
models are highly geared towards facilitating the social and the socially
accepted, regardless of the consequences of such activity on the incentive to
create by later-comers. Cohen, for example, mostly seems to want to construct
an elaborate theory to allow non-commercial fan fiction at all costs, even if
future authors would not produce or publish work because of the threat of fan
fiction. In other words, where the idea/expression dichotomy and the
alternatives-based test (along with other aspects of current copyright doctrine,
like joint author law) tend to favor a more romantic author-like creator, Cohen
chooses to favor a more derivative creator to the detriment of authors who are
more “romantic” in their creations.
140. Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, supra note 61, at 1155.
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creator should expect to enjoy as a matter of social ordering.141
The latter model attempts to develop intellectual property law
in a manner that best promotes market efficiency in the creation
and dissemination of protected artifacts.142 Setting an artificial
idea/expression limit is one way, depending on one’s view, of
either ordering the expectations of authors or promoting an
efficient market of intellectual property. Authors can either
expect a certain scope of protection, or market theorists can
expect a certain availability of communicative tools while
economically incentivizing expression. Cohen seeks to see
beyond this in her proposed decentered cultural landscape that
serves as an engine for creativity. Professor Gregory Mandel
supplements the economics-natural rights binary with another:
that between stereotypes of right- versus left-brained thought.
He offers this binary in criticism of joint author law’s tendency
to view copyrightable creativity as right-brained, and patentable
invention as left-brained. He notes that “[s]tereotypes . . . are
often both incorrect and dangerous, and such is the case here.
Current research indicates that the common author and
inventor stereotypes do not accurately portray actual creative
processes. As a result, the dichotomy between modes of
creativity for authors versus inventors - in both perception and
intellectual property law - is substantially exaggerated.”143
Copyrightable creativity should not reflect merely those
creations that seem more right-brained in origin. The brain
creates by marshaling both hemispheres in varying measures,
and any creativity inquiry should be up to the task of accepting
all such permutations of creativity.
The alternatives-based methodology relies on a further
problematic presumption—that there is a single set of
abstractions.144 Abstractions are no more than a series of
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Mandel, supra note 17, at 331.
144. One could add to this criticism a concern whether there is any set of
abstractions once the method reaches a certain general level of abstraction.
Many philosophers question the ability to abstract from the species or member
of a class to the class itself, and then further to other universal statements.
One such philosopher was George Berkeley, whose immaterialist doctrine was
based in no small part on a rejection of abstraction. He simply could not
conceive of a truly abstract idea, instead feeling himself compelled to apply
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Russian dolls in a court’s hands, sure to envelop each other
coherently. But just as the line between idea and expression can
shift between levels of abstractions, the very levels of abstraction
themselves can shift seismically. It was the philosopher Alfred
North Whitehead who pointed out that the first human to
discover counting discovered a whole new way of abstracting as
compared to all predecessors.145 The abstractions techniques
used to conceive of a copyrightable work’s levels today might not
look anything like such levels when conceived under new
abstractions methodologies of tomorrow.
And even the
abstractions technique outlined by Hand admits of numerous
distinct permutations at higher levels of abstraction. When
considering the first fifty pages of A la recherche du temps perdu,
is the idea “the story of a child who has an Oedipal complex?” Is
it “how memory is stimulated through pastry?” Is it “how to
convey a sleep state literarily” (à la Barthes)? Any of these
descriptions is possible, and none necessarily overlaps with
another. It is hard to trust a methodology dependent on such
fundamental divergence.
Professor Roberta Kwall would propose a criticism of the
current creativity methodology in copyright from another
perspective—its lack of concern for process.146 In this respect,
she observes a broad-based “belief in the universality of ‘hidden
organic development at some stage of the creative process.’”147
Creativity is not the metaphorical lightbulb going on
particular qualities to its allegedly abstract embodiment within his mind.
GEORGE BERKELEY, PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE AND THREE DIALOGUES
40-47 (Penguin Books 1988) (1710). Karl Popper couches the impossibility of
abstraction as a “problem of universals,” whereby a specific statement cannot
be abstracted to a truly universal statement. Instead, all that one can aspire
to with specific statements is the creation of “classes of individuals.” KARL
POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 45 (Routledge Classics 2002)
(1935).
145. See generally ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD, SCIENCE AND THE MODERN
WORLD (The Free Press 1997).
146. See, e.g., Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The
Intrinsic Dimension of the Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 1965
(2006) [hereinafter Inspiration and Innovation]; Kwall, Living Gardens, supra
note 36; Roberta R. Kwall, Living Gardens, Living Art, Living Tradition, 5 I.P.
THEORY 73 (2015); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Remember the Sabbath Day and
Enhance Your Creativity!, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 820 (2013) [hereinafter
Remember the Sabbath Day].
147. Inspiration and Innovation, supra note 146, at 1965.
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immediately over the creator’s head; it is an ever-developing,
ever-evolving process. Yet copyright law generally applies only
to a work of authorship “fixed in any tangible medium of
expression,”148 and the alternatives-based methodology
presumes an established snapshot of expression by which to
gauge its alternatives.
This creates potentially incorrect
results,149 as in the case finding a garden in Chicago
uncopyrightable because its constant growth belied the required
fixed form.150 Professor Kwall comments, by contrast, that the
process of garden growth is really no different than the constant
change and evolution inherent in every work of creativity, as
such works represent the result of a process,151 not an
instantaneous creation. That process often includes necessary
breaks or rests - periods of preparation and incubation that
couple with other moments of illumination and verification.152
The fluidity built into that evolution should not necessarily
cause a loss of copyright, in Kwall’s view.153 Creativity follows a
wide permutation of movements, evolutions, and processes, to
which copyright’s current doctrines seem particularly ill-suited.
Any effective view of creativity must, on some level, consider
creative process.154
By way of a final critique of the alternatives methodology
for copyrightable creativity, the test comes across as highly
unrealistic. Never have two human beings engaged in a
dialogue akin to the following:
Person 1: That movie was really creative, don’t
you think?
148. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
149. Living Gardens, supra note 36, at 912-14.
150. Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2011).
151. Living Gardens, supra note 36, at 917 (invoking “the fluidity that
exists in all of Creation”).
152. Remember the Sabbath Day, supra note 146, at 833-34.
153. Living Gardens, supra note 36, at 906 (“[T]he degree of fluidity of a
given work [should be taken into account] in determining its copyrightability,
[but] the presence of fluidity should not, in and of itself, act as a bar to
copyright protection based on the work's inability to satisfy the fixation
requirement.”).
154. Professor Clifford believes process should figure in a creativity
analysis for a more limited reason—to ensure that strictly computer-generated
artifacts do not pass muster. Random Numbers, supra note 26, at 272.
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Person 2: Yes, absolutely, the filmmaker really
selected from one of many alternative ways of
expressing the various ideas captured on film.
Person 1: I couldn’t have said it better myself.
In other words, no one thinks of creativity the way that
courts applying the alternatives-based methodology do. In view
of this, and the legion other criticisms lofted in the test’s
direction above, there must be a better-conceived, more natural
way for courts to determine the presence of creativity as dictated
by Feist. The next section will offer one possible candidate,
taken from the field of philosophy. As Justice Story once
compared copyright to “the metaphysics of the law,”155 reliance
on philosophy to supplement copyright theory is by no means
inappropriate.
With that in mind, let us see what the
philosopher Henri Bergson has to say about creativity.156
IV. A Bergsonian View of Creativity
It would seem an insurmountable task to try to summarize
a philosopher’s entire work in a few sentences or paragraphs.
This measure of caution should apply all the more to a
philosopher with as long and distinguished a career as Henri
Bergson, whose Essai sur les données immédiates de la
conscience opened a parenthesis in 1889 that would not close
before he received the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1927 and
published La Pensée et le Mouvant in 1934. To summarize
briefly a career made up of over forty years of relentlessly
155. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
156. Professor Russ VerSteeg acknowledges Bergson’s interest in this
topic in one of his articles, listing Bergson along with Plato, Aristotle,
Descartes, among others. Any of these other philosophers might have served
here, though in very different ways; but for now, I would propose focusing on
Bergson as a legitimate choice of topic in VerSteeg’s view. VerSteeg, supra
note 44, at 826. Karl Popper would have fully endorsed a use of Bergson in the
pursuit of a definition of creativity. See Popper, supra note 144, at 8 (“[M]y
view of the matter, for what it is worth, is that there is no such thing as a
logical method of having new ideas, or a logical reconstruction of this process.
My view may be expressed by saying that every discovery contains ‘an
irrational element’, or ‘a creative intuition’, in Bergson’s sense.”). Popper’s
criticisms find much support in the philosophy of Bergson, as this Section will
demonstrate.
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plumbing the depths of something as complicated as human
existence—would seem a fool’s errand, destined to omit far more
than could be included. Yet Bergson himself believes that just
such a summary is not only possible; it is potentially a desirable
product of the nature of philosophy itself. Observers of the
history of philosophy, Bergson notes, are initially tempted to see
in a philosopher’s work a somewhat complicated edifice drawing
on a wide variety of historical influences to be arranged in a
coherent, if substantial, whole.157 Close, prolonged contact with
a philosopher’s work reveals this initial view to be overwrought.
As the observer places herself in the thought of the philosopher,
the initial complication of that thought sloughs off gradually,
revealing a “single point” [un point unique], “something simple,
infinitely so.”158 So simple, in fact, that the philosopher could
not articulate it, and was instead driven to try explain this single
point through an ever-expanding series of complications and
abstractions aimed at chasing the “fleeing and evanescent
image” haunting the philosophy.159 What begins as infinitesimal
intuition in theory ends up infinite instantiation in practice. The
goal of the observer of philosophy might be couched as an
attempt to retrace the philosopher’s footsteps in the opposite
direction—to unravel and distill the complexity of the final
doctrine to uncover the original intuition animating it all. If
Bergson is willing to invite this sort of methodological practice
in conjunction with the work of other philosophers, there is no
coherent reason not to take up the invitation for Bergson’s own
work. That is precisely what this Section will initially attempt,
to distill some of Bergson’s concepts and theories into a more
summary form (if not to reach Bergson’s single initial intuition).
That process of distillation will permit a second step, an
application of Bergson’s theories to the concept of “creativity,”
both as the term is conceived legally and as it might be conceived
more generally. Much as the previous Section revealed a
fundamental rift between the legal conception of creativity
under copyright law and the “real-world” conception of the term,
this Section will demonstrate a rift between the former notion of
157. HENRI BERGSON, LA PENSÉE
[hereinafter LA PENSÉE ET LE MOUVANT].
158. Id. at 155.
159. Id.

ET

LE

MOUVANT 154-55 (2014)
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creativity and its philosophical analogue. As this distinction
becomes clearer, a new, more intuitive understanding of
creativity might supplant the legally structured, and hopelessly
flawed, iteration of the term.
Reliance on Bergsonian philosophy to sketch a concept of
creativity does not seem misplaced when one considers that the
title of Bergson’s most famous work is often translated into
English as The Creative Evolution. Questions of translation
aside,160 some of the doctrinal concepts described in that book
serve as a possible jumping-off point when considering Bergson
as a philosopher of creativity. If I were to answer Bergson’s défi
and attempt to summarize his work in one sentence, his is a
philosophy of life as a continual, unpredictable process of
unfolding, evolving, and becoming [devenir] that takes place
over a certain indivisible period of time [durée].161 Each of these
terms is quite general, and must remain so to a certain extent,
even after more in-depth analysis—for it is precisely analysis
and language under the guise of reasoning and logic that causes
these terms to lose their inherent force or élan vital.162 The
latter point is part and parcel of Bergson’s primary critique of
traditional human reasoning, and it is from the perspective of
this critique that Bergson’s more positive assertions might take
shape. Put differently, with Bergson, comprehensibility is better
served when beginning with negation before passing to
affirmation.
Bergson’s criticism of traditional human reasoning rests on
an ostensibly realistic view of that reasoning’s source. In an echo
of his predecessor Darwin, Bergson contends that human beings
160. The French title L’évolution créatrice does not track exactly to The
Creative Evolution in the most apparent sense of the translation. This is due
to Bergson’s use of the word créatrice, which has a distinctly spiritual
connotation in French, something almost akin to creationist. “Creative” in the
usual meaning of the word is créatif in French.
161. As mentioned above, this definition lends credibility to a reading that
Bergson fits within the philosophical field known as Process Thought. In this
respect, see Kwall, The Lessons of Living Gardens and Jewish Process
Theology, supra note 36, at 893 (“The essence of Process Thought is that all of
creation is constantly in process-always dynamic, and always in motion.”).
Clearly, there is substantial overlap between this definition and the summary
of Bergson’s philosophy proffered here.
162. See, e.g., HENRI BERGSON, L’ÉVOLUTION CRÉATRICE 250 (2008 ed.)
[hereinafter L’évolution créatrice].
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have fundamentally evolved to perceive the world around them
in manner that best serves their survival.163 Human intelligence
has developed, according to this evolution, in a manner that
prepares humans to act on their surroundings most
successfully.164 Human conscience and memory serve, first and
foremost, to oversee action and to clarify choice when acting.165
Success in action is most likely to occur when a human can
isolate what is perceived in the present as a sort of momentary
snapshot, and compare it to similarly momentary snapshots
stored in memory.166 That process allows for a prediction of an
effect, given the actor’s possible responses as cause. Buttressing
this process, lending it an apparent reliability, is an implication
of repetition - that if events that looked and felt a certain way in
the past produced a certain result, then events that look and feel
that way in the present will do likewise.167 Equally included is
an assumption of reversibility—events that can be redone must,
to a certain extent, be undone before they can be performed
again. As a consequence of this reversibility and repeatability,
it may be concluded that reality can be broken down into isolated
and independent groups.168
Science, and geometry in particular, according to Bergson,
take the preformed repeatability and reversibility to its extreme
end point. Bergson offers a small stove boiling water in a pan to
demonstrate this.169 Once the boiling of water on the stove has
been observed, it is natural to conclude that this same process
would occur in exactly the same way at any later time.170 In this
respect, the act of boiling water once is reduced to a member of
a class predicated on no more than a geometric relation. If one
has a lit boiler with a pan full of water on it, one will have boiled
water in an “if x, then y” relation. Such a relation is precisely the
equivalent of a right triangle, where two sides are known and

163. Id. at 29.
164. Id.
165. HENRI BERGSON, MATIÈRE ET MÉMOIRE 190 (Denis Forest and PaulAntoine Miquel eds., Flammarion 2012) [hereinafter MATIÈRE ET MÉMOIRE].
166. L’ÉVOLUTION CRÉATRICE, supra note 162, at 29.
167. Id. at 224-26.
168. Id. at 215.
169. Id. at 215-17.
170. Id. at 216.
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the length of the third is sought.171 The mental move here, as
with thought guiding human action more generally, is towards
a more generic space of repeatable and reversible abstraction.
The conversion of reality into such abstract or generic
groups, or at an even finer level, snapshots, is related to a
phenomenon
that
Bergson
calls
la
méthode
cinématographique—a movie-like method of perceiving
reality.172 As an example of this, Bergson proposes the flight of
an arrow.173 The natural tendency when imagining such a flight
is to picture the arrow at a certain number of discrete points
along its path—at t0, the arrow is in the quiver; at t1, it has
traveled a certain distance to a certain point; at t2, it might be at
the midpoint of its flight; and so on. It is precisely this sort of
decomposition of space and time that informed Zeno’s famous
paradox of the tortoise and Achilles. By decomposing the arrow’s
movement to render it susceptible to understanding, the viewer
both cuts space and collapses time, reducing these two
dimensions as necessary. If further understanding is needed,
the viewer need only add further snapshots between those
already gathered in an attempt to complete the line. The
dynamic movement of an object, then, is no more than a series
of coordinates that articulate like a fan, according to the viewer’s
whim—able to collapse snapshots to simultaneity or stretch
them out in space and time, as desired. It is precisely this idea
that animates human thought when a process is subdivided into
stages. The life course of a human might accordingly be
comprised of four stages—childhood, adolescence, adulthood,
and old age.174 Each of these four stages represents a “real
stopping point”175 [arrêt réel] concentrating the movement of a
prolonged portion of life into a single fixed or immobile

171. Id.
172. Id. at 306.
173. He proposes a number of models to describe this, actually. His hand
moving from point A to B is another example of such a model. MATIÈRE ET
MÉMOIRE, supra note 165, at 238. Zeno’s paradox of Achilles chasing the
tortoise but never catching it is yet another. Id. at 239; L’ÉVOLUTION
CRÉATRICE, supra note 162, at 310-11. This concept is probably one of Bergson’s
most common themes.
174. Id. at 311.
175. Id.
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moment.176
The common thread through each of these examples, from
the boiling water and the flying arrow to the racing reptile and
the aging human, is a tendency to reduce transition and
movement to mere “things” in “states.” The water boiling in the
pan is not a specific, stochastic variant different from all others
somewhat like it; it is just another example identical to others
like it among a class of things. The tortoise outpacing Achilles
is not endowed with specific characteristics; it is just an object
subdividing space into asymptotically decreasing halves like any
other. And for each of these things, there is, in a given movie
snapshot, an associated state. The arrow at a specific point
directed at a specific angle is in one such state. The human is in
a state of youth, adolescence, adulthood, or old age.
The similarities between this manner of reasoning and the
rationale underpinning the abstractions test should be
immediately clear. But Bergson brings the comparison into even
sharper relief when he discusses artistic or literary creation in
his essay Le possible et le réel.177 There, Bergson describes a
question that an interviewer posed to him asking him to predict
the future of literature following World War I.178 When Bergson
punted on that question, the follow-up question plumbs
Bergson’s views on what might be possible in then-future
literary currents.179 Bergson again bristles at the question, due
to its presumption that Bergson somehow holds the “key” to a
metaphorical wardrobe of possibilities for future literature.180
No, he responds, “the work of which you speak is not possible
yet.”181 The most Bergson would concede to the interviewer is
that eventually, the work will have been.182
What does Bergson mean when dismissing speculation on
the possible future of literature? In part, he views the term
“possible” as subject to two potential meanings, only one of
which would make sense in the mouth of his interviewer. This
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id.
LA PENSÉE ET LE MOUVANT, supra note 157, at 135-51.
Id. at 145.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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latter meaning of “possible,” he suggests, is “that which
encounters no insurmountable obstacle to its creation.”183 This
is the negative sense of the word possible, which would lead to a
literature susceptible of any number of future permutations, to
the extent that they are not completely foreclosed.184 From this
perspective, Bergson might theoretically speculate on future
literature, but his speculation would be almost unlimited in
scope. What took Bergson aback, by contrast, was the positive
form of the word “possible” implied in the interviewer’s
question—a form that Bergson takes to mean “that which
preexists in the form of an idea.”185 This second meaning of
“possible” is an “absurdity”186 in Bergson’s estimation. A work
only becomes possible at the precise moment when its creator
pens or paints it, the work being the specific product of that
specific person in that specific time.187 Hamlet, Bergson offers
as an example, could not be possible except as Shakespeare
wrote it at the time when he wrote it.188 What Bergson
underscores, then, is a fundamental change in polarity in how
possibility should be conceived—rather than adhere to the
traditional construction in which the possible becomes real, it is
actually the real that becomes retrospectively possible at the
time of the former’s genesis.189 There is no competition among
possibilities, just a constant, ever renewed, surge of
unpredictable novelty, or newness, and this newness is not
limited to the world of art of high theater; it envelops every being
at all times in a profoundly liberated environment.190

183. LA PENSÉE ET LE MOUVANT, supra note 157, at 147.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 148. Paul Feyerabend appears to agree with this view of the
creative process. When speaking of the relation between idea and action, he
notes that “[i]t is often taken for granted that a clear and distinct
understanding of new ideas precedes, and should precede, their formulation
and their institutional expression.” This view, however, is mistaken in his
opinion—“Creation of a thing, and creation plus full understanding of a correct
idea of a thing, are often parts of one and the same indivisible process and
cannot be separated without bringing the analysis to a stop.” PAUL
FEYERABEND, AGAINST METHOD 10 (4th ed. Verso 2010).
188. Id. at 147-48.
189. Id. at 149.
190. Id. at 150.
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Bergson’s view on possibility is certainly not above criticism
for depicting the entirety of existence as a cloud of near-complete
indeterminacy. There is a classic thought experiment that
suggests that an infinite number of monkeys chained to
typewriters would eventually write all of Shakespeare,
including, of course, Hamlet. Should a monkey actually sit down
and type Hamlet, Bergson would acknowledge that his
production will have been possible at its completion. Prior to
that, it was only “possible” in the sense that the obstacles to it—
like the monkey’s motor skills and general lack of knowledge as
to what was going on—could be overcome. Yet in reality, the
monkey producing Hamlet is possible under both meanings of
the term; it is just extraordinarily improbable. As every letter
chosen by the monkey represents a one in twenty-six chance,191
and the series of letters chosen comprise that same probability
as independent events, then the probability is simply 1/26n,
where n is the number of letters in Hamlet. That is very close to
zero, but it is not actually zero. Bergson does not seem to allow
for such a probabilistic approach, as all events are coded with
what could be deemed a probability of zero until they happen, at
which time their probability instantaneously becomes one.
That criticism aside, let us take Bergson’s Hamlet example
at face value and imagine what it has to say about the
abstractions- or alternatives-based test for copyrightable
creativity. Needless to say, his view of the test would not be
favorable, for the test seems to do any number of things that he
criticizes. First and foremost, the test is based on a method of
abstraction which gradually removes the detail from a given
work to render it a non-specific member of a class of works
answering to the abstraction. This move is entirely consistent
with the traditional form of human reasoning that Bergson
critiques. In this way, the structure of an alternatives-based test
begins by treating the creation of the work at issue somewhat
like the arrow in flight or the stages of life. It reduces the work
to a snapshot in time, in its fixed form, and then removes the
work’s vital details to make it part of a class. As noted above, no
thought is given to the development or process that went into
the creation of the work. Then the work is inserted into
191. The number would be somewhat greater if various punctuation
marks, spaces, and numbers were included.
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Bergson’s boiler paradigm as part of the question whether
alternatives do exist—for what is a court doing when
determining the expressive alternatives available for a specific
idea, if not posing an infinitely repeatable if x, then y relation?
Instead of the x and y here, however, the court places a given
idea in the place of the condition, and the potentially
copyrightable work in the place of the condition’s output. The
court does not particularly concern itself with when or how this
creation took place, the creation process is presumed identical
and repeatable at all times. And all forms of expression
answering to the idea might as well be equivalent or fungible,
with all the variety and verve of basic boiling water. Put
differently, it is the fact that each expressive alternative is just
as good as another that makes a work copyrightable, a
conclusion rooted in homogeneous equivalence.
There is, of course, some play permitted in this divergence
of a single abstract idea leading to many potential expressive
alternatives. Yet even if the court can theoretically imagine
expressive alternatives as non-equivalent when divorced from
the homogenizing idea, it still runs into certain additional
complications. One is Bergson’s view of the “possible.” Before it,
the court has one concrete example of what is possible, the work
whose copyrightability it is probing. The latter work is possible
under Bergson’s view, of course, because it has come into being.
Then and only then did the work become possible. It was not, as
the abstractions methodology implies, possible prior to its
creation - as if the work’s author or artist got an idea in an
abstract form and the work immediately took shape as a
possibility chosen among others. The court’s methodology relies
on an a priori view of creativity that defines the work as possible
in the sense of “that which preexists in the form of an idea,” a
move that Bergson would contest. The court applies the label
“possible” to a work at a time when the work was still entirely
undetermined. Needless to say, what goes for the work here goes
double for the alternatives imagined by the court. Not only were
they not “possible” (in the Bergsonian sense of the word) at the
time of the work’s creation, but they have not become possible in
the intervening time leading to the copyright litigation. Where
Bergson refused to subscribe to the existence of a wardrobe of
possibilities when queried on future literature, a court using the
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alternatives-based test presumes the existence of just such a
wardrobe, and further claims to possess its key.192
Any potential non-equivalence among the alternatives
packing a court’s wardrobe is further belied by the very space in
which the alternatives operate. Because a court generally193
considers all alternatives equally good, the imaginary space in
which these alternatives exist is a homogeneous one. The court
metaphorically draws a graph of Cartesian space, and assigns
each square an alternative equal in size and shape to every other
alternative. It is not enough that the court has the key to the
rectilinear wardrobe; it further creates sub-compartments
within that space. This type of homogeneous space nested
within further homogeneous space is precisely what Bergson
decries as an incorrect manner of perceiving reality.194
Homogeneous space, according to Bergson, is an empty
container built of “rigid abstractions,” that must be replaced.195
The key to resurrecting a new definition of creativity, in the
Bergsonian sense, is to determine what should replace the
homogeneous space of the abstractions test. What should
replace the snapshots on an arrow’s path or the repeatability of
a stove’s boiled water. Bergson’s answer to this escapes simple
summary or structure, ever reforming itself in lockstep with
ever-changing reality.196 Matter, far from being susceptible to
192. Even if there were such a wardrobe, I would be inclined to treat it as
opening indefinitely—to Narnia or any other universe imaginable, not as some
rigid, cleanly lined compartment.
193. The scènes à faire doctrine is a slight exception to this rule. See supra
note 88.
194. MATIÈRE ET MÉMOIRE, supra note 165, at 295.
195. Id.
196. As we begin to build a positive definition of creativity, I would like to
take a moment to incorporate a few thoughts on one of Bergson’s most popular
works, Le rire (or “Laughter”), his study of the comedic. HENRI BERGSON,
LAUGHTER: AN ESSAY ON THE MEANING OF THE COMIC (Cloudesly Brereton and
Fred Rothwell ed. & trans., The MacMillan Company 1914). His thesis there,
presented most broadly, is that the comedic is that which goes against social
convention, most specifically in the direction of the mechanical. Where the
social is a space of changing life, the characters who are robotic or wooden in
their behavior break with this in a way that people find funny. If the book was
published well over 100 years ago (in 1900), its ideas still resonate today. The
character Sheldon Cooper has not only cited to the book on The Big Bang
Theory, he is an incarnation of the book’s observations in his robotically logical
behavior. Setting that aside, Bergson’s thesis in Le rire would seem to throw
a wrench in this Article’s line of reasoning. Indeed, it is posited that creativity
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subdivision in different snapshots according to the méthode
cinématographique, is overflowing with “innumerable
agitations”197 [ébranlements sans nombre] emitting so many
“shivers”198 [frissons] continuously in all directions. It is this
movement as a continual phenomenon or unfolding, like the set
of ever-varying waves hitting the shore, that characterizes what
Bergson calls la durée, or duration. This concept of movement
through time is a totalizing curve, hiding behind the indefinitely
divided images that human perception gathers; and it is the
ultimate task to restore pure continuity where there is but
discontinuity and abstraction.199
Clearly, an application of Bergson’s view of reality as a
process of constant, indeterminate “coming into being” does not
lend itself to an easy or simple definition of creativity in either
the legal or more general sense. Yet it should be clear what
should not factor in any understanding of creativity—
abstractions of other “possible” works that respond to the same
“idea.” Each act of creativity is a total, indivisible process
incomparable to others like it, whose development springs from
a certain measure of indeterminacy. Comparing “alternatives”

is something more than the mechanical and robotic. Yet it is precisely such
woodenness that makes comedy creative. So is comedy an exception or
violation of the premise proposed here? There is an answer to this—the
equivalence between the mechanical in art and the mechanical in reasoning is
a false one. When presenting the mechanical in a comedic setting, the author
or playwright is not removing creativity to replace it with a rigidity
characteristic of the boiling water and arrow examples. Instead, that author
or playwright is infusing the wooden with creativity, passing the former
through the latter’s filter. Further, a lot of what makes the comedic funny is
not just the separation between the audience’s expectations and a character’s
behavior, it is that same separation played out between characters on stage.
Alceste, the main character of Molière’s Le Misanthrope (oft cited by Bergson
in Le rire) is funny because of how his odd behavior puts off the other
characters. So while there are potentially similarities between the woodenness
of traditional human reasoning and the woodenness of the comedic, such
similarities are only superficial.
197. MATIÈRE ET MÉMOIRE, supra note 165, at 257.
198. Id. at 258.
199. Id. at 233. It should be noted that this conclusion is fully consonant
with Professor Kwall’s view that copyright’s scope should include the everchanging. See Living Gardens, supra note 36, at 909 (noting that “[a] system
of copyright protection that fails to consider the relevance of fluidity of works
of authorship is out of step with how creation occurs in theory and in
practice.”).
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to this process does not make any sense for those alternatives do
not exist, and could not have come into being. All that remains
for a court to consider, when assessing a work’s creativity, is
both the process that led to a work’s genesis and the work that
followed as a result. Each should be reviewed in a totalizing
manner—the process and the work as indivisible wholes. The
court would accordingly ask two general questions—1) what
intellectual movement brought a work into being?, and 2) what
work resulted? If any meaningful indeterminacy characterizes
this process or its temporarily captured outcome, then the
presence of creativity—both legal and more general - should
follow. Creativity should quite simply map to the presence of
indeterminacy in an artifact and its creation process. And
because Bergson views the rippling of indeterminacy as a
characteristic of both the exemplary and the mundane in life,
creativity should be an easy bar to satisfy on these two counts—
just as Feist arbitrarily seemed to require. At the same time,
while Bergson seems to find the indeterminate in all things,
there must be a lower limit to that. Here, it may be necessary
to propose the existence of the strictly determinate or nearly
determinate, a proposal that Bergson seems to resist. A
traditionally designed white pages, based on a fixed set of phone
numbers and names, would seem a highly determinate
arrangement, the minor risk of errors notwithstanding. A
Bergson-inspired bar for copyrightable creativity could detect
this rare case by observing where typically dominant
indeterminacy yields to the highly determinate in a specific set
of cases. Just as Bergson is chary of observing determinacy, so
too should courts avoid such a finding under the methodology
proposed here.
If this seems a bit fluid, it unfortunately must be so. There
is no simple definition of creativity, just as there is no simple,
perfectly precise reduction of the infinitely permutable variation
of the perceived universe.200 Bergson does, however, provide
some clue as to how a creativity analysis might work when he
200. Science is not such a reduction. There are lots of good
approximations—like Newtonian mechanics to model the behavior of solid
objects on the surface of the Earth—yet any number of other models could have
been devised to describe “reality” equally well. In fact, Duhem was one of the
parties responsible for this proposition.
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discusses his mentor Félix Ravaisson’s analysis of the Mona
Lisa.201 He begins by quoting da Vinci’s observation that “every
living being is characterized by an undulating or serpentine line,
and art’s object is to render that individual form” on the canvas,
in sculpture, or whatever medium is selected.202 This line that
art seeks to represent need not be visible in the final piece of art,
Bergson comments, yet it is this line that holds the key to the
entire work.203 Thus does Bergson observe in the Mona Lisa a
tendency of the painted lines to climb towards a “virtual
center”204 situated “behind the canvas,”205 where a single word
would solve the famous smile’s sphingian mystery.206 For
Bergson, this is art, and by extension, creativity—the dynamic
consolidation and presentation of the simplest of thoughts
beyond what the eye can immediately see.207 Perhaps one should
not expect most works to live up to the creative genius of the
Mona Lisa—for few do—yet the very movement that Leonardo’s
canvas, or Proust’s incipit, captures in an ethereal center is
present in differing degrees in a child’s study hall doodle, a
grainy recording of a campfire singalong, or a hastily penned
short story chronicling a vampire’s travails. Works like these
are creative, and should be copyrightable.
V.

Conclusion

And so, to a certain extent, we have come full circle, as the
very Leonardo that the Rutgers computer program deemed
“creative” answers equally to a Bergsonian definition of
creativity. The two methodologies for reaching this same result
rest at opposite ends of a spectrum, however. On one hand, the
Rutgers software defines creativity according to a fixed formula,
measuring influence and novelty according to a pre-determined
database of images fed to it. It is an impressive piece of software,
of course, but its results are completely certain given both the
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
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LA PENSÉE ET LE MOUVANT, supra note 157, at 287-88.
Id. at 287.
Id.
Id. at 288.
Id.
Id.
LA PENSÉE ET LE MOUVANT, supra note 157, at 288.
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material input to it and its encoded algorithm. At the other end
of the spectrum lies the Bergsonian view just disclosed, where
the method for detecting creativity is as potentially varied as the
creative process itself. Creativity might flow from any of a
seemingly infinite set of processes - from the constrained to the
unconstrained, from the left-brained to the right-brained, or
from the economically motivated to the culturally born. There,
what is prized is not a work’s ability to respond to an algorithm
measuring influence on later works, but its almost inherent
novelty bound up in the inherent novelty of life. It is no
coincidence that Bergson’s most famous work is translated as
The Creative Evolution—the passage of time, and by extension,
human creation that marks it, is ever evolving and renewing
itself. That movement is not reducible to snapshots or single
images, least of all those snapshots and images that might be
fed into even the most sophisticated computer program. The
indeterminate process and genesis of a creative work finds its
reflection in the method that seeks such indeterminacy, not in
the rote application of a rigid rule structure.
Somewhere between the two poles occupied by the
indeterminate and the rote sits the abstraction-based test that
courts use to find creativity based on the presence of expressive
alternatives. Such expressive alternatives serve essentially the
same purpose as the paintings fed into the computer software—
that of reducing creativity to a series of fixed options. The court’s
methodology, in some respects, is even more wooden than its
coded counterpart. While the latter takes into account a certain
chronological ordering and development of works over time, the
abstractions test reduces creativity to a series of alternatives
available at a single instant, that of the potentially
copyrightable work’s creation. Generally speaking, there is no
probabilistic variation between such alternatives. It merely
suffices that such alternatives exist, provided that the chosen
alternative is not a stock element of the work’s genre. Despite
these strictures, a court enjoys more flexibility in applying the
abstractions test than would a computer applying a mechanistic
algorithm. A court’s definition of a work’s idea—and the
associated alternatives that flow from that definition—is subject
to no clear point of demarcation. By selecting higher levels of
abstraction to define the “idea,” a court will find a greater
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number of works copyrightable to a greater degree; by selecting
a more specific idea, fewer works will merit protection in lesser
measure. It is this flexibility that moves the abstractions test
towards a Bergsonian conception of copyrightable creativity. If
the test does take a few steps in this direction by virtue of its
flexibility in defining an idea, it does not seem to capture
adequately the indeterminacy of the creative process or work.
The artistic movement completely outside the abstractions
framework is much more akin to the Southco dicta—a space of
less defined “complex and indeterminate ideas.”
A proposed use of Bergson’s theories as a paradigm for
copyrightable creativity is not above certain criticisms.
Philosophy might generally seem insufficient when applied to a
space where a certain degree of scientific research has taken
place. Bergson would reply to this by pointing out that science
and philosophy are ever in contact along a certain boundary, and
stand to gain much from each other. This seems all the more
true in a space as fluid as creativity, where the challenges of
brain science meet the ephemera of language and the
vicissitudes of esthetics. Another line of attack might question
the utility of applying a somewhat deconstructive philosophy to
a something as theoretically structured as the law. What is
proposed here, however, is not an application of Bergson’s
thought to contracts, evidence, or civil procedure. Those (and
many other) areas of the law would clearly suffer from undue
reliance on indeterminacy. But not so for creativity, whose
inherently changing nature and deep subjectivity fit quite well
within any number of strictly philosophical views. Creativity,
even in the law, cannot be a site of rigid structure, lest the term
fail to fit its real meaning. It is just such a failure that the
abstractions-based test commits. Perhaps a more philosophical
view can restore the term its proper place and meaning, or more
accurately, its proper places and its multiple meanings—from
fits and starts to evolution and complexity.
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